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Insanity, Criminal Responsibility and Durham
The advent of a judicially-sponsored new test of insanity is
an event of first importance in the legal world and justifies a
historical survey of the evolution of the existing tests. The logic
of the law's recognition of mental incapacity as a defense to
crime is simple enough. Usually crime involves the concurrence
of a wrongful act and a wrongful intent. If the defendant because of his mental condition was incapable of entertaining the
intent, he cannot be held guilty of the crime. The man who
kills another by unavoidable accident is not a murderer. The
man who walks off with a suitcase, believing it his own, is not a
thief. So, too, the legally insane man who kills or takes possession
of property is not held guilty.
Psychiatrists may object to the legal rule that although intent
is essential, motive is irrelevant. Once it is determined that a
man intended to do the act, the inquiry is at an end; the law is
not interested in why he meant to do it. To the psychologist this
is a curious notion, for he cannot conceive of trying to understand
human behavior without asking why the individual acted as he
did.
The aim of law is not only to protect society, but also to
insure justice to the person convicted of crime. A formula defining responsibility or irresponsibility in human behavior cannot
do complete justice to individuals of unequal intellect or to those
afflicted with mental illness or emotional instability. Of all the
problems involved in the subject of mental unsoundness as a
defense to a crime, the greatest difference of opinion on the
part of the courts has centered around the legal tests of insanity.
An early English case, decided in 1724, is usually cited as
the source of the so-called "Wild Beast Test." In Arnold's case1
Judge Tracy attempted to define for the jury the line between
the mental unsoundness which will relieve from responsibility
and that which will not, as follows: "It is not every kind of frantic
humor or something unaccountable in a man's action that points
him out to be such a madman as to be exempted from punishment; it must be a man that is totally deprived of his understand1 16 How.St.Tr. 695 (1724).

ing and memory and doth not know what he is doing, no more
than an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast, such a one is never
the object of punishment."2
Earl Ferret'scase,3 decided in 1760, held that "total want of
reason would acquit the prisoner but that if there were a partial
degree of reason and a competent use of it sufficient to have restrained those passions, which produced the crime; if there be
thought and design; and faculty to distinguish the nature of
actions; to discern the difference between moral good and evil,
responsibility attaches."4
Hadfield's case,5 decided in 1800, involved a veteran of many
wars who had been discharged from the army on the ground of
insanity and was being tried for shooting at George III. It seems
the veteran was suffering from delusions that he was to sacrifice
himself for the world's salvation. He was defended by Lord
Erskine, a brilliant criminal lawyer, who introduced a new concept into the law: "delusion" as a test of responsibility. Many
years later Judge Doe in deciding the New Hampshire case of
State v. Pike6 said that "Hadfield's acquittal was not a judicial
adoption of delusion as the test in the place of knowledge of
right and wrong; it was probably an instance of the bewildering
effect of Erskine's adroitness, rhetoric and eloquence."7
In 1840 one Oxford was'tried for shooting at Queen Victoria.8 Lord Chief Justice Denman told the jury:
If some controlling disease was, in truth, the acting power
within him, which he could not resist, the defendant would
not be responsible. The question is whether the prisoner
was labouring under that species of insanity which satisfies
you that he was quite unaware of the nature, character, and
consequences of the act he was committing, or in other
words, whether he was under the influence of a diseased
mind and was really unconscious at the time he was comitting the act, that it was a crime.9
How.St.Tr. 695, 765 (1724).
'19 How.St.Tr. 886 (1760).
'Id. at 947.
527 How.St.Tr. 1282 (1800).
649 N.H. 399 (1869).
7Id. at 434.
8 Reg. v. Oxford, 9 Car.& P. 525, 173 Eng.Rep. 941 (1840).
9 Id. at 546, 173 Eng.Rep. 941, 950.
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The phrase here used, "the nature, character, and consequences of the act," was later adopted by the House of Lords in
M'Naghten's case,'0 and the use of the words "controlling disease
...

which he could not resist" suggests the irresistible impulse

test."
In 1843 Daniel M'Naghten shot and killed Drummond, private secretary to Sir Robert Peel, believing him to be Peel. The
defendant was laboring under an insane delusion that he was
being hounded by his enemies and that Peel was one of them.
The defense was insanity, and the medical evidence was in
substance that the prisoner was affected by morbid delusions
which carried him beyond the power of his own control and
left him with no perception of right and wrong. The accused was
not capable of exercising any control over acts which had connection with his delusion. The jury found him not guilty on
the ground of insanity.
The M'Naghten Rules were formulated in 1843 as a result
of the public outcry over the acquittal of M'Naghten. The
House of Lords addressed certain questions to the Judges of
England concerning the law of insanity. The answers have
since become known as the M'Naghten Rules. 13 The crucial
portion of the reply was the following: 'To establish a defense
on the grounds of insanity it must be clearly proved that at the
time of committing the act, the accused was labouring under
such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, that he did
not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if
he did know it, that he did not know that what he was doing
was wrong."14
These criteria, although based upon no actual case, became
the "right and wrong" test which is today applied in England,
Canada, and practically all our American states.' 5 New Hampshire recognizes no particular test; it is the function of the jury
to determine upon all the evidence whether the accused was
10 Clark & F. 200, 8 Eng.Rep. 718 (1843).
11Weihofen, Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Lan 24 (1933).
10 Clark & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1943).
Is Clark & Marshall, A T
isen
the Law of Crime 134 (1952).
M'Naghten, 10 Clark & F. 200, 205, 173 Eng.Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
"Reg.v.
1~Brick, The Law of Crime 277 (1946).

10
12

capable of entertaining criminal intent and hence was responsible
for his act. 16
The "right and wrong" test has been the subject of much
criticism.'

7

Cardozo, in the case of People v. Schmidt,I8 after

an exhaustive review of M'Naghten Rules cases, determined that
the right-wrong test meant inability "morally" to distinguish
right from wrong. Lord Goddard, Chief Justice of England, in
the case of Rex v. Holmes'9 has interpreted the word "wrong"
as meaning "legal wrong." Burdick says there are probably very
few cases in which distinctions between "moral" and "legal"
wrong are necessary. 20
Attempts made in England a few years after the M'Naghten
case to establish "irresistible impulse" as a defense to crime were
unsuccessful. 21 In Regina v. Thomas the defense was impulsive
insanity. The court held there was no evidence of insanity at
all and that impulsive insanity was the last refuge of a hopeless
defense.2 3 In the case of Rex v. True24 the English court said:
"There is no foundation for the suggestion that the rule derived
from M'Naghten's case has been in any sense relaxed."25 However
the British Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (19491953) has made the following finding: "The gravamen of the
charge against the M'Naghten Rules is that they are not in harmony with modem medical science, which as we have seen, is
reluctant to divide the mind into separate compartments-the
intellect, the emotions and the will-but looks at it as a whole and
considers that insanity distorts and impairs the actions of the
mind as a whole."26
Many insane persons may be fully able to distinguish what
is right from what is wrong, yet have no power to choose and
do the right because they are driven by an uncontrollable force
or irresistible impulse to do the wrong.2 7 The "irresistible im16
17

State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1870).
Weihofen, Insanity as a Defense in Crimid Law 29 (1933).

1s 216 N.Y. 324 110 N.E. 945 (1915).

19 1 W.L.R. 686 (1953).
20 Burdick, The Law of Crime 280 (1946).
:2 eg. v. Stokes, 3 Car.& K. 185, 175 Eng.Rep. 222 (1848).
227 Crim.App. 36 (1911).

Ibid.
:4 16 Crim.App. 164 (1922).
,:Id. at 170.
eFootnote 30 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
21 Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 354 (1887).
2a

pulse" test has been adopted in twenty-one American states and
the District of Columbia.28 Therefore in these states both the
right and wrong test and the irresistible impulse test may be invoked as a defense to a crime.
The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has approved the
giving of an instruction embodying the definition of "irresistible
impluse7 in the following cases: Boswell v. Commonwealth,29
31
Dejarnette v. Commonwealth,3 0 Hite v. Commonwealth,
33
Stover v. Commonwealth,32 and Thurman v. Commonwealth.
4 it held that
In the 1952 case of Thompson v. CommonwealthM
the lower court's instruction to the jury was erroneous when its
definition of insanity failed to include the doctrine of "irresistible
impulse." The case, however, was reversed and remanded on
another point. Chief Justice Hudgins speaking for the Court said:
There is no evidence tending to prove that his volitive powers were any more impaired than were his perceptive
powers. The "irresistible impulse" doctrine is applicable only
to that class of cases where the accused is able to understand the nature and consequences of his act and knows it
is wrong, but his mind has become so impaired by disease
of the mental power to control
that he is totally deprived
35
or restrain his act.

The Virginia Court has approved the following definition of
"irresistible impulse":
...an

impulse induced by, and growing out of some mental

disease affecting the volitive, as distinguished from the perceptive powers, so that the person afflicted, while able to
understand the nature and consequences of the act charged
against him and to perceive that it is wrong, is unable because of such mental disease, to resist the impulse to do it.
It is to be distinguished from mere passion or overwhelming
emotion not growing out of, and connected with, a disease
IsBurdick,

The Lan of Crime 278 (1946). The states which have adopted the irresistible
Ky., La., Mass., Mich.,
impulse test are: Ala, Ark Colo., Conn., Del., Ga., Ill.,
Mont., N.M., Ohio, Penn., Utah, Vt., Va., Wash. and Wyo.
2920 Gratt. (61 Va.) 860 (1871).
s075 Va. 867 (1881).
8196 Va. 489, 31 S.E. 895 (1898).
82 92 Va. 780, 22 S.E. 874 (1895).
ss107 Va.912, 60 S.E. 99 (1908).
s'193 Va. 704, 70 S.E.2d 284 (1952).
asId. at 717, 70 S.E.2d 284, 292.

of the mind. Frenzy arising solely from the passion of anger
and jealousy regardless of how furious, is not insanity.38
The Federal District Court for the District of Columbia
recognized the right-wrong test in United States v. Guiteau,3 7
but the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia refused to
extend it in the case of Taylor v. United States.38 The court
rejected "emotional insanity" as a defense, citing with approval
the following from the trial court's instruction to the jury:
Whatever may be the cry of scientific experts, the law does
not recognize but condemns the doctrine of emotional insanity-that a man may be sane up until a moment before
he commits a crime, insane while he does it, and sane again
soon afterwards. Such doctrine would be dangerous in the
extreme. The law does not recognize it; and a jury cannot
without violating their oaths. 39
40
This position was reaffirmed in Snell v. United States.

In 1929 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in the case of Smith v. United States41 declared: "We
have no hesitation in declaring it to be the law of this district
that, in cases where insanity is interposed as a defense, and the
facts are sufficient to call for the application of the rule of irre42
sistible impluse, the jury should be so charged."
In 1945 the Supreme Court of the United States43 upheld
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in its
refusal to reverse Fisher v. United States44 on the appellants
contention that an instruction should be given on "diminished
responsibility" for a mental disorder short of insanity. Justices
Murphy, Frankfurter, and Rutledge dissented, while Justice
Jackson took no part in the consideration of the case.
The case of United States v. Baldi45 in 1951 involved a prosecution for murder which came before six courts of record, be's193 Va. 704 717, 70 S.E.2d 284, 292 (1952).
'7 12 D.C. (1 kackey) 498, 10 F. 161, (1882).
88 7 App.D.C. 27 (1895).
P9Id. at 41.
40 16 App.D.C. 501, 524 (1900).
&136 F.2d 548 (1929).
" Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1945).
46 149 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
45 192 F.2d 540 (3rd Cir. 1951).

fore a state board of pardons, before a lunacy commission.46
Upon appeal, the conviction of the accused was upheld. But in a
dissenting opinion Chief Justice Biggs of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit spoke out against the
century-old legal formula of responsibility of the State of Pennsylvania: "Changes can be effected and reason can be brought
to the law of criminal insanity. The rule of M'Naghten's case
was created by decision. Perhaps it is not too much to think
that it might be altered by the same means." 47
On July 1, 1954, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in the case of Durham v. United States"s departed from the famous M'Naghten Rules and the irresistible
impulse test. The defendant, who had a background of four
commitments to a mental hospital, was convicted in the District
Court of housebreaking despite his defense of insanity. On appeal, the case was reversed and remanded. Not only did the
court speak out against the inadequacies of the right-wrong and
irresistible impulse tests, but it firmly laid down the principle
that these previously well-established precedents are no longer
to be regarded as exclusive. Judge Bazelon speaking for the
court stated the new test as follows:
It is simply that an accused is not criminally responsible if
his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental
defect. We use disease in the sense of a condition which is
considered capable of either improving or deteriorating and
which may be either congenital, or the result of injury, or the
residual effect of a physical or mental disease. 49
Invoking its "inherent power"5 0 to define insanity, the court
set forth an instruction to the jury which would be used under
the rule announced:
If you the jury believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused was not suffering from a diseased or defective
mental condition at the time he committed the criminal act
charged, you may find him guilty. If you believe he was
1e Roche,

Criminality and Menta lllness-Two Faces of tlh
Rev. 320, 322 (1955).
192 F.2d 540, 568 (3rd Cir. 1951).
"8214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
49 Id. at 874, 875.
50 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
47

Same Coin, 22 U.Chi.L.

suffering from a diseased or defective mental condition when
he committed the act, but believe beyond a reasonable
doubt that the act was not the product of such mental abnormality, you may find him guilty. Unless you believe beyond a reasonable doubt either that he was not suffering
from a diseased or defective mental condition, or that the
act was not the product of such abnormality, you must find
the accused not guilty by reason of insanity. Thus your task
would not be completed upon finding, if you did find, that
the accused suffered from a mental disease or defect. He
would still be responsible for his unlawful act if there was
no causal connection between such mental abnormality and
the act. These questions must be determined by you from
the facts which you find to be fairly deductible from the
testimony and the evidence in this case.5 1
The Circuit Court in the Durham case thus adopted a test
which is similar to the one promulgated in 1870 by the New
Hampshire case of State v. Pike.52 In this early New Hampshire
case the substance of the instruction by Judge Doe 3 3 was:
...

if they found that the defendant killed Brown in a man-

ner that would be criminal and unlawful if the defendant
were sane-the verdict should be "not guilty by reason of
insanity' if the killing was the offspring or product of mental
disease in the defendant; that neither delusion nor knowledge of right and wrong, nor design or cunning in planning
and executing the killing and escaping or avoiding detection,
nor ability to recognize acquaintances, or to labor or transact
business or manage affairs, is, as a matter of law, a test of
mental disease; but that all symptoms and all tests of mental
disease are purely matters of fact to be determined by the
jury.54

Prior to Durham v. United States,55 the New Hampshire
solution to the problem of mental irresponsibility had never
61214 F.2d 862, 875 (D.C.

Cir. 1954). The court said in footnote 46, [id. at 874]:
"Our approach is similar to that of the Supreme Court of California in People v.
Maughs, 1906, 149 Cal. 253t 86 P. 187, 191, where the court prospectively invali.
dated a previously accepted instruction, saying, 'We think the time has come to say
that in all future cases which shall arise and where, after this warning, this instruction shall be given, this court will hold the giving of it to be so prejudicial to the
rights of a defendent secured to him by our Constitution and laws, as to call for the
reversal of any judgment which may be rendered against him.'"
s49 N.H. 399 (1870).
58 See Reik, The Doe-Ray Correspondence: A Pioneer Collaboration in the Jurisprudence
of Mental Disease, 63 Yale L.J. 183 (1953). See also Judge Doe's dissenting
opinion in Boardman v. Woodman, 47 N.H. 120, 148 (1866).
66 49 N.H. 399, 402 (1870).
5 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).

been squarely adopted anywhere outside its state of origin except in Montana.5 6 The Supreme Court of Washington in 1909
rejected the New Hampshire insanity test in the case of State
v. Craig:57 "In so far then as we are concerned, whether insanity be a question of science or of law, there should be no
objection to the keeping of the law in the law courts, leaving
science in the control of its undisputed field."58 The New Hampshire test was also rejected by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
in the case of Eckert v. State59 in which the court upheld the
refusal of the lower court to instruct on mental disease as a
defense to a murder charge.
In May, 1954 the Supreme Court of New Mexico in the
case of State v. White 6o adopted an extension of the M'Naghten
Rules. Citing the Report of the British Royal Commission on
Capital Punishment (1949-1953), p. 111, the court established
the following rule: "The jury must be satisfied that at the time
of committing the act, the accused as a result of disease of the
mind * * * [sic] (a) did not know the nature and quality of the

act or (b) did not know that it was wrong or (c) was incapable
of preventing himself from committing it.'"61
In the case of Stewart v. United States,62 decided fifteen
days after the Durham decision, 63 the accused was convicted of
first degree murder committed in robbing a grocery store. On
appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia through Judge Bazelon reversed and remanded the case
stating that the mental disease or mental defect test which was
laid down in the Durham case would be applicable upon retrial.
It is worthy of note that the court evidenced a tendency to reconsider the advisability of the diminished responsibility test
which it had rejected in Fisher v. United States:64 "We have
concluded that reconsideration of our decision in Fisher should
wait until we can appraise the results of the broadened test of
56 Weihofen,

The Flowering of New Hampshire, 22 U.ChLL.Rev. 363 (19SS).
67 52 Wash.. 66, 100 P. 167 (1909).
5852 Wash. 66,. _100 P. 167, 169.
59 114 Wis. 160, 89 N.W. 826 (1902).
00 58 N.M. 324,270 P.2d 727 (1954).
4158 N.M. 324
270 P.2d 727, 731.
6214 F.2d 879 (D.C Cir. 1954).
"214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 19S4).
64 149 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1954).

criminal responsibility which we
Durham."6s

recently announced

in

The court in the Durham decision said:
We find that as an exclusive criterion the right-wrong
test is inadequate in that (a) it does not take sufficient account of psychic realities and scientific knowledge, and (b)
it is based upon one symptom and so cannot validly be applied in all circumstances. We find that the "irresistible
impulse" test is also inadequate in that it gives no recognition
of mental illness characterized by brooding and reflection
and so relegates acts caused by such illness
to the application of the inadequate right-wrong test.66
In March, 1955 the Court of Appeals of Maryland in the
case of Salinger v. Superintendent of Spring Grove State Hospita67 and the case of Thomas v. Maryland88 discussed the Durham decision but did not adopt its test of criminal responsibility.
Judge Collins speaking for the court in the Thomas case stated:
"There is no evidence of a mental disease or mental defect to
satisfy the New Hampshire rule adopted in the Durham and
Stewart cases, supra, which we do not here adopt."69
In the light of these recent developments the question arises
as to whether Virginia should accept the new test for criminal
responsibility by giving more weight to the rationale of the
Durham decision based upon present-day scientific knowledge
than it did to the New Hampshire decision of 1870.70 As late
as 1952 the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia after quoting
a definition of "irresistible impulse" in the case of Thompson v.
Commonwealth7 ' stated: "Many unsuccessful attempts have
been made to formulate a more accurate definition of legal in2
sanity."7
*s214 F.2d 879, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
06214 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
Md.. ......
112 A.2d 907 (1955).
s . Md........
112 A.2d 913 (1955).
GoId. at ......
112 A.2d 913, 919.
10 State v. Pike. 49 N.H. 399 (1870).
11 193 Va. 704, 70 S.E.2d 284 (1952).
7 Id. at 717, 70 S.E.2d 284, 292.

Dr. Jay L. Hoffman, First Assistant Physician at St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Washington, D. C., has said:
Under the Durham decision the psychiatrist is not restricted in giving testimony in regard to the insanity of an
accused. No longer will he be shackled by the right and
wrong test and the irresistible impulse test. The psychiatrist
will have greater freedom to contribute to the courtroom
solution of separating the criminal from the insane. Due to
the very vagueness of the court in setting forth the definition
of "mental disease" and "mental defect," the psychiatrist will
jury as
be able to share his knowledge with the court 7and
3
he learns more and more about mental diseases.
As was stated in Hollovay v. United States,74 the principal
function of the psychiatrist is to inform the jury of the character
of the mental disease. By permitting the psychiatrist to testify
more fully under the new test adopted by the Durham case, the
jury would be greatly aided in arriving at a more intelligent and
equitable decision as to the criminal responsibility of the defendant. While an immediate reaction to Durham is a legitimate
fear that there will be too many acquittals upon the ground of insanity, there is no solid reason for anticipating that use of the
new test will have any such result. What constitutes mental
disease and how it operates are purely medical questions, and
under the new test the legal system will not attempt to impose
upon medical witnesses concepts which they may or may not
consider correct and adequate. They will be completely untrammeled in their approach, and the new test will be compatible with all future developments in the psychiatric field.
It is submitted that Virginia should study the Durham decision with a view to adopting a more modem and scientific test of
insanity to replace the "right and wrong" and the "irresistible
impulse" tests.
David Oscar Williams, Jr.

78
Personal Interview,
7, 148 F.2d 665 (D.C.

April 12, 1955.
Cir. 1945).

